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It's called Manufacturing:
A Closer Look at Missouri's Groundwater Law
Citizensfor Ground Water Protectionv. Porter'
I. INTRODUCTION
One word can really make a big difference. In 2008, the word
manufacturing was used to describe an exception to the Higday v.
Nickolaus (hereinafter "Higday") rule concerning reasonable use in the
extraction of groundwater in Missouri. 2 After the Higday ruling, it
seemed that it would be fairly easy in the future to apply the
manufacturing exception to almost anything. To better demonstrate this,
we turn to the instant case, Citizens for Ground Water Protection v.
Porter,(hereinafter"Porter")where the court illustrated exactly how far it
was willing to push the broad definition of manufacturingunder Higday.
By following the Higday rule, any change to extracted groundwater could
now be considered manufacturing. For example, any use of machinery to
make groundwater suitable for use would meet the manufacturing
requirement. It will be interesting to see how other courts will interpret
the broadened Higday exception in the future. This note will explore the
court's holding and analysis of Porter, compare the court's interpretation
of Higday to the instant case, and comment on the potential environmental
and developmental effects of the holding.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

In August 2006, Gulfstream Bioflex Energy, L.L.C. (hereinafter
"Gulfstream") contracted with William Larry Porter, Linda Jo Porter,
Robert Porter, Mary Porter, and Jeff Porter, property owners of adjacent
tracts of land in Webster County, for an opportunity "to purchase a total of
252 acres for the purpose of constructing and operating an ethanol
' 275 S.W.3d 329 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
2 See id. at 350 (citing 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971)); see also infra text
accompanying note 77.
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manufacturing plant."3 Before Gulfstream was able to acquire the
contracts, it had to obtain the necessary documentation from the
government, including permits and test drilling, to make certain that
sufficient water was available to satisfy the needs of the operation.4
In late August 2006, Gulfstream announced its intentions to invest
165 million dollars for the construction of its plant.5 "In order to evaluate
the suitability of the site for the plant's proposed operations, Gulfstream
first required the drilling of a test well in order to measure the volume of
Once
water available and determine the water's characteristics."6
suitability was determined, Gulfstream anticipated drilling several more
wells to meet the need for the maximum capacity that the plant would
require.
Webster County had no planning and zoning ordinances; therefore,
the Webster County Commission ordered the formation of the Webster
County Groundwater Impact Committee. 8 The aim of the Webster County
Groundwater Impact Committee was to "investigate any possible impact
of the proposed plant on the environment." 9
Citizens for Ground Water Protection (hereinafter "Citizens"), a
non-profit corporation incorporated on September 22, 2006, opposed the
test drilling and construction of the ethanol manufacturingplant. Citizens
subsequently filed a petition for preliminary and permanent injunction on
October 2, 2006, against the Porters and Gulfstream (collectively,

Id.at 333.
333-34. "The site was selected for its access to highway and rail transportation, in
to
order provide ease of transportation of corn and the finished product, and its close
proximity to a natural gas pipeline. There is a convenience store, a baseball park, and a
used-car lot situated east of the site. Situated directly west of the site is an automotive
junkyard, west of which is an industrial park. The property north of the site is used
predominately for agricultural purposes, including cattle and horse operations. The
surrounding area is sparsely populated." Id. at 334.
5
Id.
4 Id. at

6

id.

7

Id. The additional wells will be to a depth of approximately 1,600 feet and cased to a
depth of approximately 650 feet. Id.
Id.

9Id.

216

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 17, No. I
hereinafter "Defendants").10 On October 5, 2006, Citizens petitioned for a
temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin Gulfstream from any drilling
activities for fifteen days." Citizens asserted that the report issued by the
Webster County Groundwater Impact Committee stated that the use of the
wells would result in "immediate and irreparable injury, loss and/or
damage to Plaintiff and its members[.]"l 2
On October 5, 2006, the Circuit Court of Webster County issued a
temporary restraining order, enjoining Gulfstream "from drilling a deep
well on the Porter property for fifteen days[,]" and set the bond amount at
$25,000. " Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Citizens' petition and, in
response, Citizens filed an amended petition, which added various other
plaintiffs' 4 (Citizens and these additional plaintiffs are collectively,
hereinafter "Plaintiffs").' 5
On March 6 and 7, 2007, the trial court found that Plaintiffs' experts
offered no credible scientific evidence to support the Plaintiffs'
allegations; however, the court found credible the Defendants' experts
testimony, "as well as the exhibits displaying the abundance of water in
the Ozark Aquifer in Webster County."' 6 Therefore, the trial court
concluded that the proposed plant would have little impact on the
individual Plaintiffs. 1
Furthermore, the trial court found that Defendants' testimony on
issue
of dangers posed from discharged water at the site was
the

11Id
12 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). On October 13, 2006,
Citizens deposited $25,000 cash with the circuit clerk, and the trial court entered an order
approving that deposit as satisfying the bond requirement in the TRO. Id.
Id. at 334-35. These plaintiffs included Gary Rogers, Carol Alberty, Harry Coambes,
Susan Tolliver, Rancel Clark, and Ronnie Williams, directors of Citizens and Webster
County residents. Id. at 335.
i5 Id.
16 Id. at

340-41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
" Id. at 341.
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credible.' 8 According to the trial court, "Plaintiffs have presented no
credible evidence that the proposed ethanol plant will fail to comply with
water quality regulations and requirements for the State of Missouri." 19
The trial court found that Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden to
establish and prove their pleaded claims and therefore, entered judgment
for Defendants on both counts of Plaintiffs' petition and ordered the
"[b]ond of $25,000.00 discharged and same ordered returned to
Plaintiffs." 20 Plaintiffs appealed the court's denial of any relief on their
petition, and Defendants appealed the court's release of the bond.2 '
Upon appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern
District incorporated the trial court's findings and conclusions without any
further evaluations.22 The appellate court reversed and remanded with
directions to the trial court to discharge and return the $25,000 bond to
23
Plaintiffs.2 3 The judgment
in all other respects was affirmed. 24
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

Appellate courts generally affirm a trial court's decision unless the
decision is against the weight of the evidence, there is insufficient
evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. 25 Therefore, a
court will set aside a trial court's decision only when firmly convinced that
the judgment is wrong.26

18 Id.

at 342 ("The trial court noted Hamilton's experience as a water treatment and
discharge engineer and the fact that Hamilton inspected the site and employed accepted
scientific and engineering principles, 'neither of which was done by Mr. Aley."').
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
219
0
Id.
21
22

23
24

Id.

Id. at 336.

Id. at 353 (internal quotation marks omitted).

id.

Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
26 Landwersiek v. Dunivan, 147 S.W.3d 141, 146
(Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
25
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A. The Reasonable Use Doctrine in America
American courts through the mid-nineteenth century generally
followed the English law rule related to percolating groundwater. 27 The
English law rule permits a municipality that owns land to collect
underlying percolating water and use it to supply its inhabitants despite the
effect it might have on adjoining landowners.2 One of the first cases to
announce the English rule of absolute ownership was Acton v. Blundell
(hereinafter "Acton").2 9 In Acton, a mining company pumped water on its
property, which dried up water wells on neighboring property owned by a
cotton spinner. 30 The cotton spinner sued for damages, alleging that
property rights in percolating groundwater were entitled to the same
protections as those afforded to riparian rights in surface streams.3 1 The
court refused to extend the riparian rights to percolating groundwater and
it offered several reasons for its decision. 32
First, the court held that riparian rights were unbefitting for
resolving groundwater debates.3 3 The court rationalized that riparian
rights rules were impossible to apply simply because there was no way the
public could have knowledge of the mutual uses of surface water by
adjoining landowners and the origin and course of such water. 34 The court
also reasoned that commercial development would be impeded if
neighboring landowners were accorded correlative rights to
groundwater. 5 Among these impediments was the example given that
even if someone wanted to put the water to better use, once rights to
groundwater were fixed by prior use laws, those rights could not be

27
28

29
30

Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
d

See (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. Ct.).
Eric Behrens & Matthew G. Dore, Rights ofLandowners to PercolatingGroundwater

in Texas, 32 S. TEX. L. REv. 185, 188 (1991).
31
32

id.

Id. (citing Acton,
Id. (citing Acton,
34
Id. (citing Acton,
3s Id. (citing Acton,
33

152
152
152
152

Eng. Rep.
Eng. Rep.
Eng. Rep.
Eng. Rep.

at 1232-35).
at 1233).
at 1233).
at 1234).
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disturbed.3 6 The court also held that there would be no way to define the
scope of liability for one who violates the riparian rights approach. 7 It
would be difficult to ascertain the liability of a landowner who uses more
than his share of the water because of the unknown extent of the
groundwater flow. 38
Finally, the "Roman law, the only available precedent, did not
impose liability where a landowner intercepted groundwater that flowed
beneath his neighbor's land."3 9 Based on that reasoning, the Acton court
adopted what amounted to a rule of capture with respect to groundwater,
now known as the absolute ownership rule or English rule. 40
About twenty years later, American courts started to break-away
from the absolute ownership rule.41 Among these courts, Bassett v.
Salisbury Manufacturing Co. (hereinafter "Bassett") was in the forefront
of American water rights when the New Hampshire Supreme Court
rejected the English rule of absolute ownership and adopted instead what
has been variously labeled as the rule of reasonable use or correlative
rights. 42 In Bassett, the court held that the owners of a dam, which
obstructed the natural drainage of water from the land of another, that
caused actual injury, were liable to that landowner, unless such obstruction
was reasonable in regards to their own land.4 3
Bassett inexplicitly addressed some issues with the English rule.
For one, the Bassett court did not see a sufficient foundation for the
doctrine of absolute ownership due to the difficulty of determining the
direction and extent of percolation and drainage." The Bassett court felt
that no difficultly existed in most cases and that the injured party can be
provided for in accordance with settled legal principles.4 5 The Bassett
36
3
3

Id. (citingActon, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1234).

1Id. at 188-89 (citing Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1234).
1 d. at 189.

39

Id. (citingActon, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1234-35).
Id. (citing Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1235).
41 Id. at 190.
42 Behrens & Dore, supra note 29, at 190 (citing 43 N.H. 569 (1862)).
43 Bassett, 43 N.H. at 569.
4 Id. at 574.
40

45

d
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court ultimately held that the English rule left no room for remedies for
malicious acts in relation to the interference by each landowner with his
own land.4 6 The Bassett court explicitly acknowledged Acton in one
paragraph, but decided not to address the reasoning conflicts that existed
with the conclusion it adopted.47 The Bassett court held that it was unable
to assent to the reasoning by which Acton had been reached.4 8
Since Bassett, there have been a number of states that adopted the
reasonable use rule. For example, in 1896, the court in Cabot v. Kingman
held that the defendants, sewer commissioners, could be held liable for
subsidence damage to the adjoining land, where the pumping of water
from the sewer trench caused water from the adjoining land to run into the
trench. 49 Additionally, in 1919, the court in Chicago City Railway. Co. v.
Rothschild & Co. held that a landowner who withdrew underground water
from wells that caused a loss of support under the adjoining street railway
tracks, because of the consequent removal of water under the wells, was
liable for the subsidence caused on the ground that adjoining landowners
have the right to support their land.5 0 Furthermore, in 1958, the court in
New York Central Railway Co. v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., (hereinafter

"Marinucci Bros.") held that a landowner owes a duty to the adjoining
landowner to use reasonable care in excavating so that the lateral support
of the adjoining land is not removed.5 In MarinucciBros., a construction
company was liable for negligently causing subsidence to adjoining land
because it failed to use sufficient sheathing to support the adjoining land
and to prevent water from the adjoining land from flowing into the
52
excavation site.
Based on the aforementioned cases, a new rule was formed. The
American rule or reasonable use rule, allows the use of groundwater by
landowners as long as it is reasonable in the view of others. 53 However,
46 id

47

1d. at 576.

48

d

44 N.E. 344, 345 (Mass. 1896).
'o 213 111. App. 178 (1919).
49

5
52 149 N.E.2d 680, 682 (1958).

d

s3 Behrens & Dore, supranote 29, at 190.
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what is reasonable use is not always clear. 54 All of the pertinent factors
including the parties involved, climatic conditions, the comparative value
of their uses of the groundwater and their relative positions must be
evaluated by the court on a case-by-case basis to determine reasonable
use.5
For that reason, the majority of American courts that have
addressed groundwater issues are in favor of the American rule because
the correlative rights approach produces more equitable results and is
better suited to climatic conditions in the United States.5 6
B. Reasonable Use in Missouri
By the turn of the century, Missouri courts also became dissatisfied
with the English common law rule and began applying the reasonable use
rule.5
Deriving from the ruling of Bassett in 1862, many American
courts rejected the doctrine of absolute ownership and adopted a rule of
reciprocal reasonable use, and Missouri soon followed suit.58
Generally, the rule of reasonable use means "that one must use his
own property in a way that does not injure another." 59 Missouri is
somewhat significant for the fact that it has almost no statutory law
concerning rights of individuals and the public dealing with
watercourses.60 Despite this, Missouri adopted the reasonable use rule in
1895 when the St. Louis Court of Appeals decided Springfield
Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins (hereinafter "Springfield').6 1 In Springfield,
the plaintiff owned land where a spring was located and the water from
this spring was forced into a reservoir, stored there, and eventually sold to
the City of Springfield.6 2 On an adjoining tract, the defendants had
dammed the flow of several springs into a pond, draining the pond
54
55
56

id.
d.
d

v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
Id. n.4 (citing Bassett v. Salisbury Manufacturing Co., 43 N.H. 569, 573 (1862)).
9
Id. at 866.
6Id.
at 870 (citing Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. 1964)).
61 See 62 Mo. App. 74 (1895).
62
Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 867.
5Higday

58
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frequently during periods of drought, thereby diminishing the flow of the
plaintiffs spring.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants acted
maliciously and for the sole purpose of injuring the plaintiff and sought to
enjoin the defendants from interfering with his groundwater supply.6
The trial court in Springfield held that "[percolating] water is
regarded as a part of the soil and to which an adjoining proprietor has no
absolute or natural right. It belongs to the owner of the land, and its
diversion and appropriation by him for the improvement or benefit of his
estate [cannot] be made the basis for complaint against him by anyone,
however grievous the resulting injury may be." 65
In spite of the trial court's holding, the appellate court held that the
defendants acted with the sole purpose of injuring the plaintiff because the
defendants invariably selected the periods of drought to drain the water. 66
The court held that the repairs, which caused the drainage, could have
been made when there were no droughts, which wouldn't have resulted in
any harm to the plaintiff.67 The Springfield court ultimately held that the
plaintiff was entitled to some relief and protection against the repetition of
such conduct. 6 8
The above rule is illustrated in Higday.69 The issue at hand in
Higday was "whether the averments of the petition entitle[d] plaintiffs, to
a judicial declaration of their rights to the percolating waters underlying
their lands, and if so, whether defendant's, City of Columbia's, threatened
use of the percolating waters is such an infringement of those rights as will
be enjoined by equity." 70
The facts in Higday are as follows: the appellants were the owners
of 6000 acres of farmland overlying a water basin in known as the

63 id

6 Id.
Id. at 868 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Sjringfield, 62 Mo. App. at 80).
Springfield,62 Mo. App. at 84-85.
6Id.
at 83.
68
Id. at 84.
69 See Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
'o Id. at 861.
65
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McBaine Bottom.7 ' The appellants used their underground water for
consumption, livestock, and for the future irrigation of their crops. 72 The
respondent planned for the withdrawal of water by shallow wells from
beneath appellants' farms to transport the water to the City some twelve
miles away for sale to customers within and maybe around the City.73
The appellants filed a petition stating that respondent had embarked upon
a course of action that would ultimately culminate in damage to the
appellants by the permanent lowering of the water throughout the basin
resulting in the impoverishment of the appellants' lands. 74
The trial court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss, which
alleged the appellants' petition, failed to plead a claim upon which relief
The respondents alleged that Missouri followed the
could be granted.
common law rule "that a landowner has absolute ownership to the waters
under his land and, therefore, may without liability, withdraw any quantity
of water for any purpose even though the result is to drain all water from
beneath his neighbors' land[]." 7 6 The court in Higday rejected the
common law rule in favor of the rule of reasonable use.7
The court
articulated this rule as follows:
As it applies to percolating groundwater, the rule of
reasonable use recognizes that the overlying owner has a
proprietary interest in the water under his lands, but his
incidents of ownership are restricted. It recognizes that the
nature of the property right is usufructuary rather than
absolute as under the English rule. Under the rule of
reasonable use, the overlying owner may use the subjacent
groundwater freely, and without liability to an adjoining
owner, but only if his use is for purposes incident to the

72

id

7 Id at
7
4 Id. at

861-62.

863.
Id at 861.
76
Id. at 863.
7

7

Id at 869.
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beneficial enjoyment of the land from which the water was
taken. This rule does not prevent the consumption of such
groundwater for agriculture, manufacturing, irrigation,
mining or any purpose by which a landowner might
legitimately use and enjoy his land, even though in doing
so he may divert or drain the groundwater of his
neighbor.7 8
The Higday court further stated that "an overlying owner, including a
municipality, may not withdraw percolating water and transport it for sale
or other use away from the land from which it was taken if the result is to
impair the supply of an adjoining landowner to his injury." 79 This use
would be considered unreasonable because it is non-beneficial and it "is
not for a 'lawful purpose"' within the general rule concerning percolating
waters.8 0 Finally, the plaintiff usually bears the burden of proving their
allegation that defendant's use is unreasonable. 8 1
While the Higday court reaffirmed the American rule, it also laid
down law that appeared to have language that is analogous with the
common law rule, stating that a landowner may divert or drain
groundwater of his neighbor as long as the use is for manufacturing.
IV. INSTANT DECISION

On appeal, Plaintiffs alleged that the trial court erred in finding that
Defendants' proposed use of groundwater was reasonable. 8 3 In general,
Plaintiffs' experts testified that Defendants' proposed use would have an
unreasonable impact upon Plaintiffs, while Defendants' experts testified
that Defendants' proposed use would have very little, if any, impact upon
78

Id. at 866 (emphasis added).

79 id.
80 Id. (quoting

Bristor v. Cheatham, 255 P.2d 178, 178 (Ariz. 1953)).
Fin., Inc. v. Smith, 755 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Shaffer
Ct. App. 1983)).
v.
82 Terrydale Mgmt. Corp., 648 S.W.2d 595, 609 (Mo.
81 Sur-Gro

Higday,469 S.W.2d at 866.

Citizens for Ground Water Protection v. Porter, 275 S.W.3d 329, 342 (Mo. Ct. App.
2008).
83
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Plaintiffs, therefore, making the proposed use reasonable. 84 The trial court
made the decision of which witnesses to believe; and the appellate court
upheld the trial court's decision to believe the Defendants' witnesses.85
Furthermore, the court was of the opinion that Plaintiffs interpreted
the Higday rule much too narrowly. 86 The court held that under the
Higday rule, there is no per se prohibition on the taking of groundwater
from land for manufacturing purposes.87 Plaintiffs did not suggest that
Defendants had no legal right to enjoy the use of their land for
manufacturing, but simply objected to the taking of the groundwater to
Plaintiffs' detriment.8 8 In addition, Higday's reasonable-use rule prohibits
sale only "if the adjoining landowner is thereby deprived of water
necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of his land," and that the
reasonable taking of groundwater from the land for manufacturing is
allowed. 89 The court upheld the trial court's finding that the pro osed use
of groundwater would have little, if any, impact on Plaintiffs., For the
above reasons, the court held that "Plaintiffs' failed to carry their burden
of proving that Defendants' intended use of groundwater was
unreasonable. . . ."9

V. COMMENT
A. Missouri's Combinationof the English Rule and Reasonable Use
It has been noted above that since Bassett, many American courts
started preferring the reasonable use rule. 92 Some notable cases, also

SId. at 347-48.
s Id. at 348, 353.
" 6See id. at 350-51.
8
1Id. at 350.
89

Id. at 351 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Higday v. Nickolaus, 469
S.W.2d 859, 870 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971)).
9 Id.
91 Id.
92

See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
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discussed above, were Cabot v Kingman,93 Chicago City Railway Co. v
Rothschild & Co.,94 and Marinucci Bros.,95 just to name a few. These
cases rejected the English rule and used the reasonable use rule, without
much explanation of why.
Porter followed in the footsteps of these other cases upholding the
reasonable use doctrine. However, Porter had a little help from Acton
when it decided to follow Higday. Basically, since Bassett left so many
questions unanswered when it decided to switch from the English rule to
the reasonable use rule, there was a lot left to ponder. An important issue
was the fact that the court in Acton felt that the English rule would better
protect the rights of commercial development from being impeded from
collecting groundwater if a reasonable use rule was in place. 96 This was a
very important issue because the Acton court reasoned that once rights to
groundwater were fixed by prior use, even those who would put the water
to better use could not disturb those rights. 97 Missouri seemed to have
noticed this issue when it decided Porter.
The Porter court followed Higday's exception to the reasonable
use rule. The Higday case was a groundbreaking decision. The Higday
court felt that commercial development had a higher right to access
groundwater despite the injury to adjoining landowners. 9 8 The decision in
Higday single handedly changed the course of water rights in Missouri.
Now, the reasonable use rule does not prevent the consumption of
groundwater for manufacturing even though doing so may divert or drain
the groundwater of a neighbor. 99 This decision unmistakably legitimized
the biggest issues in the Acton case regarding the right to disturb fixed
groundwater rights when the commercial users put the water to better use.
While Higday and Porter did not say this explicitly, nevertheless,
it was quite apparent from the rulings. So now, the Porter court, armed
93 44 N.E. 344 (Mass. 1896); see also supra text accompanying note 48.
94 213 Ill. App. 178 (1919); see also supra text accompanying note 49.
9s
96

149 N.E.2d 680 (Mass. 1958); see also supra text accompanying notes 50-5 1.
Acton v. Blundell, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1234 (Ex. Ct.).

97 id.
98

Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
9 Citizens for Ground Water Prot. v. Porter, 275 S.W.3d 329, 350 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 866).
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with the Higday ruling, seems to have created a combination of the
reasonable use and the English rule doctrines. This combination helped
create an exception that will probably have a lasting effect on future
groundwater cases in the United States.
With such a big change in policy, it was surprising that Porter
never explicitly stated the rationale behind the exception to the reasonable
use rule. One could argue that the need for alternative fuel sources played
a major role in the court's decision. It seems that the Porter court had to
make a choice between protecting the adjoining landowner's water rights
and protecting a potential new fuel alternative. It would seem that the
lesser of the two evils was protecting a potential new fuel alternative. As
Americans, we rely a great deal on gasoline to survive in this fast pace
world we have created for ourselves. However, most of the gasoline we
consume comes from other countries, and within the last few years'
gasoline has become very expensive. With that in mind, having an
alternative fuel source here in America is a very important option. Some
gas stations now sell ethanol mixed fuel that is generally cheaper than
regular unleaded gasoline. So when the Porter court had to choose
between an adjoining landowner's water rights, who arguably was not
injured by the groundwater taking, and a potential alternative fuel for
America, it seems that the court chose the bigger picture.
As for the other rationalizations in Acton, each no longer
necessarily applied, thanks to technology. With the technology of the
twenty-first century, experts have the ability to know what the mutual uses
of water by adjoining landowners will be, and exverts are in a better
position to define the scope of liability for violators. oo For example, the
court in Porter was able to come to a conclusion based on credible
testimony and scientific calculations of the Defendants' witnesses as well
as the exhibits displaying the abundance of water in the Ozark Aquifer in
Webster County, 01 which lead to the finding that the use of the
groundwater for manufacturing was not an unreasonable use.

100Cf Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 574 (1862).
101 Citizens, 275

S.W.3d at 340-41.
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B. What is ManufacturingExactly?
Following the ruling in Porter,it appears that it will almost always
be a losing case for a plaintiff who alleges unreasonable use of
groundwater against a commercial developer. It seems that it would be
fairly easy in the future to apply manufacturing to almost any type of
labor. There is no definition given for manufacturingin either Higday or
Porter. Therefore, turning to the general use of the word, Black's Law
Dictionary defines manufacture as "[a] thing that is made or built by a
human being, as distinguished from something that is a product of nature;
esp. any material form produced by a machine from an unshaped
composition of matter." 02 This is a very broad definition because almost
anything manmade would be considered manufacture. It appears that the
Porter court followed this broad definition of manufacturing when it held
that the drainage of groundwater to make ethanol was considered
manufacturingunder the Higday rule.
What does Higday's broad definition of manufacturing mean to
noncommercial landowners? By following such a definition suggested by
Black's Law Dictionary, any change to collected water would be
considered manufacturing. Groundwater could be considered raw material
and therefore, by using machinery to make it suitable for use, it appears to
meet the requirement of manufacturing set by the Portercourt.
C. PossibleFutureImplicationsfrom the Citizens' Ruling
With such a broad definition of the Higday rule, the Porter court
has opened a mighty wide door for commercial developers' use of
groundwater. The Porter court resolved the issue at hand very efficiently
by the use of expert testimony and because there was no apparent injury to
Plaintiffs. In spite of this, it failed to provide unambiguous guidance for
other circumstances in which landowners may wish to use the
groundwater below their land. There seems to be a great need for
legislative action in resolving and settling groundwater disputes. A

102 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

984 (8th ed. 2004).
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possible reason why the legislature is reluctant to provide a bright-line rule
is because of the difficultly in harmonizing the facts in groundwater cases.
This has led courts to evaluate all of the pertinent factors including the
parties involved, climatic conditions, the comparative value of their uses
of the groundwater and their relative positions on a case-by-case basis to
determine reasonable use.1 03
The legislature could act more quickly to remedy groundwater
disputes rather than relying on the courts to do so. For example, if the
legislature defined such terms as manufacturing,it would be quite simple
for the courts to rule on an issue similar to the one in the Portercase. The
legislature could also better determine whether or not commercial
developers should be given differential treatment over adjoining
landowners in groundwater disputes. However, even with a bright-line
rule, the courts will still most likely have to rely heavily on expert
testimony on the technical aspects and the consequences of certain usage
on the adjoining landowner. So despite bright-line rules, experts will
continue to play an important role in determining the outcome of a
groundwater usage case.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Portercourt affirmed the trial court's decision by adopting the
Higday exception to the reasonable use rule. By defining Hidgay so
broadly, the court might have set a precedent that would make it virtually
impossible for future plaintiffs to win a groundwater removal case against
a commercial developer. Thus, there is a clear need for legislative
assistance in this arena because most landowners are ill equipped to battle
big companies which impose such a threat. Though the ruling seems to be
correct on its face, based on the evidence presented and the Higday rule,
the broadened rule still suggests a dim future for landowners. It will be
interesting to see how the new rule plays out in the legislature. Will the
legislature adopt Porter's ruling or will it adopt something new? Only
time will tell, but for now, it appears that commercial users of
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groundwater could possibly have unfettered usage rights despite the harm
it might cause to their neighbors.
BRIAN HAMILTON
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